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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—EXTRADITING THE FOREIGN FUGITIVE: 
DISENTITLEMENT IN CIVIL FORFEITURE. UNITED STATES V. ALL ASSETS 
LISTED IN ATTACHMENT A, 89 F. SUPP. 3D 817 (E.D. VA. 2015) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you are residing in your home country, and suddenly you 
receive a notice for your arrest. You are shocked as you learn that the deal-
ings from your successful self-made business have violated laws in another 
country where you have never lived nor visited. Suddenly, extradition pro-
ceedings begin in order to bring you to this foreign country to face criminal 
charges. Like most reasonable people, you resist the extradition because you 
want to stay in your own country with your own home and family. In an 
effort to fight with all your might, you hire a lawyer to help you contest the 
extradition. 
As your extradition is pending, you receive another notice. On top of 
everything else, the foreign country is now trying to extradite you to face 
criminal charges and seeking a forfeiture action to seize your bank accounts 
and other property. The millions of dollars you have earned through hard 
work in your company, and perhaps even your home, is now on the line. 
You try to contest the forfeiture action, but you are informed by the foreign 
country that you are a fugitive from the law, and thus not entitled to the pro-
tection of the courts. As a result, the foreign government claims that your 
accounts are illegal proceeds of your alleged criminal actions and seizes all 
of your accounts. 
Surely, this does not seem like a possible problem in the United States 
with all of the protections of the Constitution, but one may be surprised. 
These are the same events that faced Kim Dotcom (“Dotcom”), a resident of 
New Zealand, and the other website operators of Megaupload.com.1 In 
2012, the United States charged Dotcom and the four operators of 
Megaupload.com with conspiracy to commit copyright infringement and 
issued warrants for their arrests.2 The five defendants resisted extradition to 
the United States according to their rights under existing extradition trea-
ties.3 
 
 1. Trevor Burrus, And You Thought Civil Asset Forfeiture Was Bad Enough, CATO 
INST. (July 9, 2015, 1:38 PM), http://www.cato.org/blog/you-thought-civil-asset 
forfeiture-was-bad-enough. 
 2. United States v. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d 813, 818 (E.D. 
Va. 2015). 
 3. Burrus, supra note 1. 
126 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
In response to the resistance, the U.S. government filed a civil forfei-
ture action in regards to several of Dotcom’s and the other defendants’ as-
sets, claiming that the assets were proceeds of the conspiracy.4 A civil for-
feiture is an in rem proceeding that the government initiates in order to seek 
forfeiture of property tainted by some form of illegality.5 When the claim-
ants attempted to contest the forfeiture of their property, the U.S. District 
Court of the Eastern District of Virginia declared them to be fugitives under 
the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, and thus not entitled to use the re-
sources of the court to litigate the civil forfeiture action.6 
The fugitive disentitlement doctrine, found in 28 U.S.C. § 2466, states 
that a judicial officer may use discretion in preventing a person from using 
the “resources of the court” to further a claim in any related civil forfeiture 
action upon finding that the person is a fugitive who is evading criminal 
prosecution.7 Because Dotcom and the others had received notice of war-
rants for their arrest in the criminal matter and were resisting extradition to 
the United States, the district court concluded that Dotcom and the website 
operators were fugitives.8 The court stated that these events provided evi-
dence that the defendants were evading criminal prosecution and were thus 
disentitled from defending the civil forfeiture action in court.9 After apply-
ing the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, the court ruled that their due process 
 
 4. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d at 817. 
 5. 1–18 ROBERT S. FINK, ET.AL.,TAX CONTROVERSIES—AUDITS, INVESTIGATIONS, 
TRIALS §18.01, LexisNexis (2015); see also N. Brock Collins, Note, Fugitives and Forfeiture 
– Flouting the System or Fundamental Right?, 83 KY. L.J. 631, 632 (1995) (explaining that in 
rem means that the confiscated property is the defendant in the civil forfeiture action, and not 
the property’s owner). 
 6. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d at 835. 
 7. See 28 U.S.C. § 2466 (2012): 
(a) A judicial officer may disallow a person from using the resources of the 
courts of the United States in furtherance of a claim in any related civil forfeiture 
action or a claim in third party proceedings in any related criminal forfeiture ac-
tion upon a finding that such person – 
(1) after notice or knowledge of the fact that a warrant or process has 
been issued for his apprehension, in order to avoid a criminal prose-
cution— 
(A) purposely leaves the jurisdiction of the United 
States; 
(B) declines to enter or reenter the United States to 
submit to its jurisdiction; or 
(C) otherwise evades the jurisdiction of the court in 
which a criminal case is pending against the person; and 
(2) is not confined or held in custody in any other jurisdiction for 
commission of criminal conduct in that jurisdiction. 
 8. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d at 827. 
 9. Id. at 826–32. 
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right to defend their property was waived in the civil forfeiture action due to 
their fugitive status, leaving them with no other defense of their property.10 
This note proposes that the fugitive entitlement doctrine should have no 
application in civil forfeiture actions concerning criminal suspects living 
abroad who are legally resisting extradition for two reasons: first, these sus-
pects cannot be properly labeled as “fugitives” due to their exercise of a 
legal right; second, the fugitive disentitlement doctrine was originally tai-
lored towards criminal appeals. Thus, its modernized application in civil 
forfeiture actions regarding claimants abroad is overbroad, deprives claim-
ants of their rights, and presents opportunities for government abuse. At a 
minimum, claimants involved in extradition should not be included in the 
doctrine’s definition of “fugitive” or automatically labeled as fugitives under 
the intent element of the doctrine. Instead, this note suggests that extradition 
claimants should be excluded from the application of the fugitive disenti-
tlement doctrine altogether. 
Part II examines the history behind the concept and purpose of the fugi-
tive disentitlement doctrine and its broadening application to civil forfeiture 
actions, the enlarging scope of the label “fugitive,” as well as the circuit 
court split regarding the intent element of the doctrine. Part III identifies the 
problems with this expansive application of the doctrine, as well as the due 
process, extradition, and governmental abuse concerns that the use of the 
doctrine creates. Part IV considers a new definition of “fugitive,” which 
excludes extradition claimants in order to preserve their rights, and proposes 
that the intent analysis of the Sixth and District of Columbia Circuits under 
the doctrine be adopted as the universal test. Part V finally proposes that 
extradition claimants should be excluded from the application of the doc-
trine all together. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Fugitive Disentitlement Under the Common Law 
The history of United States’ fugitive disentitlement doctrine spans 
over one hundred years.11 Initially, the doctrine was used to dismiss the ap-
peal of a defendant who was a “fugitive from justice” while his appeal was 
pending.12 If the convicted criminal defendant fled from justice while his 
appeal was pending, the courts could invoke the doctrine to disentitle him 
 
 10. Id. at 832 n.21. 
 11. Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97, 97 (1876) (applying the fugitive disentitlement 
doctrine to dismiss the appeal of a defendant who was a fugitive from justice for the first 
time). 
 12. Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 239 (1993). 
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from pursuing that appeal.13 The Supreme Court created the doctrine due to 
concerns that judicial proceedings would have no effect on the fugitive, and 
any adverse judgment would thus be unenforceable against the fugitive due 
to his flight.14 Without power over the fugitive, the Court determined that it 
had discretion to refuse to hear the criminal’s appeal unless he was in court, 
where he could be made to respond to any judgment rendered.15 Thus, the 
doctrine prevented a fugitive evading justice from seeking relief in an appeal 
from the same authority he evaded.16 
1. Who Is a Fugitive Under Common Law? 
Under the common law disentitlement doctrine, fugitive status applied 
to a narrower class of people than its modern, codified counterpart. At 
common law, a “fugitive” was defined as a person who, after committing a 
crime, fled the jurisdiction of the court where the crime was committed or 
left his place of residence and hid himself.17 Later, the term was extended to 
suspected criminals who had not been convicted or arrested, but who left the 
jurisdiction for the purpose of escaping arrest or prosecution for the alleged 
crime.18 As long as the person left the jurisdiction voluntarily, he was con-
sidered a fugitive even if he had no control over his failure to return.19 
The term “fugitive” thus only applied to defendants and suspected 
criminals who had first been in the jurisdiction of the courts and later fled in 
order to avoid criminal proceedings.20 Fugitive status was not assigned to 
citizens of foreign countries who had never even entered the territorial juris-
diction of the United States.21 As Justice Holmes stated over a century ago, 
“[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing 
detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the 
harm as if [the foreign actor] had been present at the effect, if the State 
 
 13. Martha B. Stolley, Supreme Court Review: Sword or Shield: Due Process and the 
Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 751, 752 (1997). 
 14. Id. at 753. 
 15. Id. at 753–54. 
 16. Id. at 752. 
 17. Collazos v. United States, 368 F.3d 190, 196 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 18. Collins, supra note 5, at 637. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See Collazos, 368 F.3d at 199 (describing common law fugitives as persons who 
allegedly committed crimes while in the U.S. and then fled the country after learning that 
their arrest was sought). 
 21. See 36 AM. JUR. 2D Forfeitures and Penalties § 63 (2015). (explaining how modern 
disentitlement doctrine extends beyond common law fugitives to encompass persons who 
have never previously been in the United States). 
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should succeed in getting [the person] within its power, . . . [but] it does not 
follow that [the person] is a fugitive from justice.”22 
2. Rationales Behind the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine 
At common law, several rationales were set forth to justify the applica-
tion and suitability of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine.23 In Smith v. Unit-
ed States,24 the Supreme Court reasoned that the use of the doctrine to dis-
miss an appeal when a convicted party fled its jurisdiction was necessary 
because the court could not enforce its judgment against the party unless he 
was present in court to receive the judgment of the appeal.25 The doctrine 
was also used to ensure orderly and efficient proceedings to avoid the delay 
caused by a fugitive’s escape.26 
Courts rationalized the use of fugitive disentitlement in other ways, as 
well.27 For example, the doctrine was seen as necessary to protect the dignity 
of the court by preventing a criminal appellant from disappearing and thus 
flouting the authority of the trial court and the court adjudicating his ap-
peal.28 Deterrence was another rationale issued for the use of the doctrine.29 
Courts reasoned that a criminal defendant would be deterred from escaping 
justice if his privilege to challenge his conviction would be lost when he was 
recaptured.30 The fourth rationale issued by the courts for application of the 
doctrine was disentitlement.31 Courts interpreted a fugitive’s flight from 
justice as a waiver or abandonment of any appeal or claim.32 
3. Disentitlement and Due Process 
The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause requires that an individual 
be given an opportunity to be heard and to defend the claims against him.33 
 
 22. Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911). 
 23. Kiran H. Griffith, Comment, Fugitives in Immigration: A Call for Legislative 
Guidelines on Disentitlement, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 209, 209 (2012). 
 24. 94 U.S. 97 (1879). 
 25. Angelo M. Russo, Note, The Development of Foreign Extradition Takes a Wrong 
Turn in Light of the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine: Ninth Circuit Vacates the Requirement 
of Probable Cause for a Provisional Arrest Inparretti v. United States, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 
1041, 1050 (2000). 
 26. Stolley, supra note 13, at 778. 
 27. Id. at 776–82 (discussing the four main rationales behind the disentitlement doc-
trine). 
 28. Id. at 779. 
 29. Id. at 780. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 777. 
 32. Stolley, supra note 13, at 777. 
 33. Brief Amici Curiae for the Cato Inst., Inst. for Justice, and Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal 
130 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
Due process thus prevents courts from constitutionally dismissing an action 
without providing a party an opportunity for a hearing on the merits of his 
case.34 Constitutional due process encompasses the right to be heard and to 
defend,35 but it does not include a constitutional right to appeal a prior 
judgment.36 Thus, disentitlement originally treated a defendant’s flight dur-
ing the pendency of an appeal as a waiver or abandonment of his desire to 
appeal.37 
4. Broadening Application of the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine 
The application of the disentitlement doctrine began in criminal ap-
peals,38 but its use has evolved to encompass other situations as well.39 Fugi-
tives no longer had to flee a specific sovereign to invoke the doctrine’s use; 
flight from any sovereign barred the fugitive from the right to appeal.40 The 
doctrine was also extended to prevent a “fugitive in a separate but related 
criminal case from seeking affirmative relief from the court in a civil pro-
ceeding.”41 More recently, circuit courts invoked the disentitlement doctrine 
in civil, in rem proceedings.42 
Until recently, the circuit courts, however, were split regarding the use 
of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine in civil forfeiture actions.43 The ma-
jority of circuit courts held that a fugitive claimant in a civil forfeiture action 
was “flouting the judicial system and [thus] was not entitled to due pro-
cess.”44 The Seventh Circuit was the first to hold otherwise, stating that pre-
clusion from procedural self-defense represented a violation of due pro-
cess.45 The court stated that regardless of an individual’s status, “where he is 
vulnerable to being sued,” the Supreme Court has established that such a 
claimant “has the right to defend himself [in an] action brought against 
him.”46 The Supreme Court attempted to resolve this split in Degen v. Unit-
 
Def. Lawyers in Support of Claimants-Appellants at 5, United States v. All Assets Listed in 
Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d 813 (E.D. Va. 2015) (No. 15-1360) [hereinafter Brief Amici 
Curiae]. 
 34. Stolley, supra note 13, at 772. 
 35. Brief Amici Curiae, supra note 33. 
 36. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977). 
 37. Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 240 (1993). 
 38. Griffith, supra note 23, at 213–14. 
 39. Collins, supra note 5. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Stolley, supra note 13, at 756. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 760. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. United States v. $40,877.59 in U.S. Currency, 32 F.3d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir. 1994). 
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ed States,47 but its efforts failed to remedy the confusion and inequity re-
garding the application of disentitlement in civil forfeiture actions.48 Con-
gress, however, effectively ended this split by codifying the fugitive disenti-
tlement doctrine’s application in civil forfeiture actions.49 
B. The Modern Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine 
Civil forfeiture underwent a massive reform embodied in the Civil As-
set Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA).50 As a part of this reform, 
Congress codified the fugitive disentitlement doctrine in CAFRA under 28 
U.S.C. § 2466.51 The codification of the doctrine effectively settled the ques-
tions left from the Supreme Court’s decision in Degen by specifically en-
dowing statutory authority over federal courts to order disentitlement in civil 
forfeiture actions.52 
1. Statutory Elements of 28 U.S.C. § 2466 
The statutory disentitlement found in 28 U.S.C. § 2466 extends the 
doctrine beyond its use in common law.53 The statute states five prerequi-
sites courts must find before ordering disentitlement: 
(1) a warrant or similar process must have been issued in a criminal case 
for the claimant’s apprehension; (2) the claimant must have had notice or 
knowledge of the warrant or process; (3) the criminal case must be relat-
ed to the forfeiture action; (4) the claimant must not be confined or oth-
erwise held in custody in another jurisdiction; and (5) the claimant must 
have deliberately avoided prosecution by leaving the United States, de-




The statute thus expanded the status of “fugitive” to encompass persons 
who refused to return to the United States or refused to enter the country for 
 
 47. 517 U.S. 820 (1996). 
 48. Stolley, supra note 13, at 783; see also Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 829 
(1996) (stating that the Court need not decide if enforcement of disentitlement would violate 
due process). 
 49. See 28 U.S.C. § 2466 (2012). 
 50. David B. Smith, Feature, An Insider’s View of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act 
of 2000, 24 CHAMPION 28, 28 (2000). 
 51. Id. at 32. 
 52. Collazos v. United States, 368 F.3d 190, 198 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 53. Id. at 197 (stating that statutory disentitlement extended to individuals 
who have never previously been in the U.S. but have notice that they are subject to arrest in 
this country, and, therefore, refuse to enter to enter its jurisdiction to avoid prosecution). 
 54. United States v. $671,160.00 in U.S. Currency, 730 F.3d 1051, 1055–56 (9th 
Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2466 (2012). 
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the first time, even if they were legally residing outside the jurisdiction.55 
The broader scope of the statute effectively prevents a claimant from de-
fending a civil action from abroad.56 
The codified statute, however, does not make disentitlement mandato-
ry; federal courts have been given discretion to decide whether to bar fugi-
tives from pursuing claims in related civil forfeiture actions.57 The discre-
tionary element of disentitlement allowing a claimant to contest fugitive 
status was included to prevent the government from abusing disentitlement 
by attempting to seize property in forfeiture that was not subject to forfei-
ture.58 Additionally, the discretionary element was meant to protect persons 
living abroad from indictment for the sole purpose of invoking the doctrine 
and forfeiting their property when they fail to appear in the United States to 
contest charges.59 
2. The New Scope of Fugitive Disentitlement 
The fugitive disentitlement doctrine now applies to broader classes of 
people than the original doctrine under common law.60 The statute defines 
“fugitive,” and requires courts to first find that a claimant fits within that 
definition before invoking the use of disentitlement.61 Under common law, 
fugitive disentitlement applied to alleged criminals who had fled the juris-
diction of the United States to escape prosecution.62 Individuals who had 
never previously entered the United States were not considered “fugitives” 
by the court.63 
 
 55. Id. at 1056. 
 56. Joel T. Kornfield & Anthony A. De Corso, Uncivil Forfeitures: Skillful Practitioners 
Can Take Advantage of the Newly Available Remedies to Undo Unjustified Civil Forfeitures, 
L.A. LAWYER, Oct. 2003, at 39, 46. 
57 Smith, supra note 50, at 32. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See 28 U.S.C. § 2466(a)(1)(A)-(C) (2012) (extending fugitive status to claimants 
who have never been in the United States, but decline to enter for the purpose of avoiding 
prosecution). 
 61. Id. 
 62. United States v. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d 813, 824 (E.D. 
Va. 2015) (according to traditional common law, fugitives were persons who allegedly com-
mitted crimes while in the United States and who, upon learning of their arrest, fled the coun-
try purposely to avoid criminal prosecution). 
 63. Id. 
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a. Broader definition of fugitive 
The scope of 28 U.S.C. § 2466, however, encompasses the common 
law classifications and beyond.64 Subpart A of the statute applies to tradi-
tional common law fugitives who fled the country upon learning of their 
arrests for crimes purportedly committed in the United States.65 The use of 
the phrase “reenter” in subpart B applies to the other common law class of 
fugitives, namely those who were outside the country when they received 
notice of their arrests for alleged crimes committed while in the United 
States and who refused to return to the jurisdiction to face prosecution.66 
Subpart B also extends the doctrine’s use beyond the common law usage by 
its inclusion of the phrase “decline to enter . . . the United States.”67 This 
provision enables the application of disentitlement to individuals who had 
never entered the United States, but who refused to enter the country to 
avoid criminal prosecution.68 
The statute broadened the scope of the doctrine to apply to a claimant 
who “otherwise evade[d] the jurisdiction of the court in which a criminal 
case is pending against [him].”69 As the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit noted, 
“[E]vasion” is an expansive concept . . . [and] is broad enough to include 
the deliberate flight identified in subpart (A) and the refusal to “enter or 
reenter” identified in subpart (B) . . . [thus] indicat[ing] that the evasion 
referred to in subpart (C) reaches beyond these specific examples to myr-
iad means that human ingenuity might devise to permit a person to avoid 
the jurisdiction of a court where a criminal case is pending against him.
70
 
As a result, subpart C of the statutory definition has been enlarged to 
encompass almost any action taken to avoid the jurisdiction of a court not 
already covered in the previous subparts. 71 
 
 64. Collazos v. United States, 368 F.3d 190, 197 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 65. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d at 824; see also 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2466(a)(1)(A). 
 66. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d at 824; see also 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2466(a)(1)(B). 
 67. See 28 U.S.C. § 2466(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
 68. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d at 824. 
 69. 28 U.S.C. § 2466(a)(1)(C). 
 70. Collazos, 368 F.3d at 200. 
 71. See 28 U.S.C. § 2466(a)(1)(C). 
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b. Statutory intent element 
Despite its application to a broader class of claimants, the text of the 
codified disentitlement doctrine requires that a claimant must have declined 
to enter, re-enter, or otherwise evade a court’s jurisdiction with the intent to 
avoid criminal prosecution.72 The statute does not specify the “requisite 
showing of intent” necessary to show that the alleged fugitive acted in order 
to avoid criminal prosecution.73 As a result, the circuit courts split on the 
requisite intent necessary to satisfy the statute.74 
Three views have emerged regarding the necessary showing of intent in 
order to invoke the use of disentitlement.75 The first view, held by the Unit-
ed States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and D.C. Circuits, holds that “mere 
notice or knowledge of an outstanding warrant, coupled with a refusal to 
enter the United States, does not satisfy the statute.”76 The alleged fugitive 
must have declined to enter or reenter the United States with the express 
purpose of avoiding criminal prosecution.77 
The second view, held by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, holds that the intent of the alleged fugitive should be ana-
lyzed under the totality of the circumstances.78 Under this view, all circum-
stances of the claimant are analyzed to indicate whether the claimant made a 
conscious choice not to enter or return to the United States to face criminal 
charges against him.79 While claimants must be shown to have possessed a 
 
 72. Id. § 2466(a)(1). 
 73. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d at 826. 
 74. See United States v. $6,976,934.56, Plus Interest Deposited into Royal Bank of Scot. 
Int’l, Account No. 2029-56141070, Held in the Name of Soulbury Ltd., 544 F.3d 123, 132 
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (stating that notice of an outstanding warrant and refusal to enter the United 
States did not meet the intent element of the statute); see also Collazos, 368 F.3d at 201 (stat-
ing that the intent of the suspected fugitive must be evaluated under the totality of the cir-
cumstances); see also United States v. $671,160.00 in U.S. Currency, 730 F.3d 1051, 1056 
(9th Cir. 2013) (holding that a desire to avoid prosecution need not be the sole reason for the 
alleged fugitive’s refusal to enter the United States). 
 75. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d at 826. 
 76. $6,976,934.56, Plus Interest, 554 F.3d at 132 (finding insufficient evidence of intent 
where claimant was living abroad before being charged with criminal conduct, and no other 
evidence was provided to show he remained abroad to avoid prosecution); see also United 
States v. Salti, 579 F.3d 656, 664 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding insufficient evidence of intent 
where claimant’s ill health may have factored in his choice to remain abroad, rather than 
avoidance of criminal prosecution). 
 77. $6, 976,934.56, Plus Interest, 554 F.3d at 132. 
 78. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d at 826; see also Collazos, 368 F.3d 
at 201. 
 79. See Collazos, 368 F.3d at 201 (finding sufficient evidence of intent to avoid 
prosecution when claimant remained outside the U.S. upon notice of a warrant for her arrest, 
failed to appear for deposition hearings, and unsuccessfully had attorney negotiate a surren-
der that would not involve her pretrial detention). 
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specific intent to avoid criminal prosecution, that intent does not need to be 
the only or motivating reason the claimants refused to enter the United 
States.80 
The third view regarding intent, held by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit, states that a “desire to avoid prosecution need 
not be the sole reason for the claimant’s refusal to enter the United States.”81 
Under this view, a claimant must have the specific intent to avoid prosecu-
tion, but that specific intent need not be the “sole, principal, or dominant 
intent.”82 Specific intent is thus met if any of the claimant’s motivations for 
declining to enter or reenter the United States was to avoid criminal prose-
cution.83 
III. PROBLEMS: CONSEQUENCES AND OUTCOMES OF THE APPLICATION OF 
28 U.S.C. § 2466 
The fugitive disentitlement doctrine codified in CAFRA has defined 
the term fugitive too broadly, and has created many complications. The new 
definition of fugitive allows disentitlement in civil forfeiture on a much 
larger scale than the original common law doctrine.84 As a result, this expan-
sive application has created issues concerning due process and extradition 
rights.85 The codification of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine has also 
presented many more opportunities for government abuse by its enlargement 
of the fugitive class.86 
A. “Fugitives” Are Not Always Fugitives 
The codification of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine at 28 U.S.C. § 
2466 has broadened the potential class of defendants that can be labeled as 
“fugitives.”87 Black’s Law Dictionary defines a fugitive as a “criminal sus-
 
 80. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d at 826. 
 81. Id.; see also United States v. $671,160.00 in U.S. Currency, 730 F.3d 1051, 1056 
(9th Cir. 2013). 
 82. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d at 826. 
 83. Technodyne, 753 F.3d at 386. 
 84. See supra notes 55–60 and accompanying text. 
 85. Smith, supra note 50, at 32; Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, United States v. Batato, 833 
F.3d 413, No. 15–1360 (4th Cir. July 8, 2015) (stating that claimants who were exercising 
their legal right to contest extradition were declared “fugitives” because they were not com-
ing to the United States to defend their property). 
 86. See generally Darpana Sheth, Policing for Profit: The Abuse of Forfeiture, 14 
ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 24, 24 (2013) (describing the potential for 
governmental abuse in civil forfeiture); see also Collazos v. United States, 368 F.3d 190 (2d 
Cir. App. 2004) (describing the enlargement of the fugitive class due to the codification of 
disentitlement). 
 87. See Collazos v. United States, 368 F.3d 190, 197 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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pect or a witness in a criminal case who flees, evades, or escapes arrest, 
prosecution, imprisonment, service of process, or the giving of testimony,”88 
especially by “fleeing the jurisdiction or by hiding.”89 The statutory provi-
sion of disentitlement has changed the application of the doctrine by going 
beyond this common law definition of fugitive and including persons who 
have never previously been in the United States and who refuse to enter its 
jurisdiction.90 
These claimants, however, are not fugitives according to historical 
common law precedents.91 Extradition claimants, such as Dotcom, who have 
never been to the United States, are being labeled as fugitives and thus de-
nied their due process rights in civil forfeiture simply because they chose to 
fight extradition to stay at home in their country.92 There is also a question 
as to their intent regarding their resistance of extradition. Statutory disenti-
tlement requires that the criminal suspect acted “in order to avoid criminal 
prosecution.”93 While some “fugitive” foreign claimants may resist extradi-
tion with the intent to avoid prosecution, other “fugitive” claimants may 
have other motives behind their resistance to extradition.94 
1. Legal Rights and Extradition 
An individual who is resisting extradition is not necessarily acting as a 
fugitive attempting to flee or escape criminal prosecution; he may just be 
exercising his legal right. For example, under the extradition treaty between 
New Zealand and the United States, Dotcom has a legal right to contest his 
 
 88. Fugitive, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Collazos, 368 F.3d at 197. 
 91. See generally Collazos, 368 F.3d at 196–97 (describing common law a fugitive as a 
person who avoided justice by fleeing the place where he allegedly committed the crime, and 
not as a person who had committed acts outside of the jurisdiction). 
 92. See generally United States v. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d 
813, 827–31 (E.D. Va. 2015) (holding Dotcom and other defendants were declared fugitives 
within the doctrine’s application due to their failure to willingly submit themselves to the 
United States’ jurisdiction through extradition). 
 93. 28 U.S.C. § 2466(a)(1) (2012). 
 94. See generally United States v. Salti, 579 F.3d 656, 664 (6th Cir. 2009) (stating that 
the showing of intent lacked sufficiency when evidence showed claimant may have stayed 
abroad for health reasons and not necessarily to avoid criminal prosecution); United States v. 
$6,976, 934.56, Plus Interest Deposited into Royal Bank of Scot. Int’l, Account No. 2029-
56141070, Held in the Name of Soulbury Ltd., 554 F.3d 123, 132–33 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (stat-
ing that the showing of intent was not sufficiently proved when evidence showed that claim-
ant desired to stay abroad regardless of criminal proceedings against him in the United 
States). 
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extradition.95 According to New Zealand extradition law, the prosecution 
must show that there is enough evidence to substantiate the criminal charges 
against Dotcom, and Dotcom has a legal right to rebut these charges by 
showing a lack of probable cause.96 Under many other extradition treaties, 
an individual may be entitled to a hearing to determine whether there is 
probable cause to believe that he committed the offense before he can legal-
ly be extradited to a foreign jurisdiction to face criminal prosecution.97 At 
this hearing, the individual then has the right to offer evidence to contradict 
or undermine the probable cause.98 Unfortunately, the courts often interpret 
the exercise of this right as the claimant’s refusal to enter the jurisdiction to 
face criminal prosecution, thus invoking the application of disentitlement.99 
2. Effect of the Intent Element on Extradition 
The statutory disentitlement provision is silent on the required showing 
of intent by an alleged fugitive.100 Instead, the codified doctrine only re-
quires that an alleged fugitive must have acted “in order to avoid criminal 
prosecution.”101 Under the totality of the circumstances view and the sole 
reason to avoid prosecution view, the necessary intent of avoiding prosecu-
tion is too easily met in the cases involving extradition claimants simply by 
the fact that these claimants resisted extradition. For example, a claimant has 
been found to be an alleged fugitive with the intent to avoid prosecution 
under the totality of the circumstances approach because the circumstance 
indicated that the claimant made a conscious choice not to enter the United 
States to face criminal prosecution.102 Under the sole reason view, the gov-
ernment can show a claimant’s specific intent to avoid criminal prosecution 
if his motivation for declining to enter the United States was avoidance of 
prosecution.103 Unfortunately, under the totality of the circumstances view 
 
 95. See generally Extradition, art. IV, N.Z.-U.S., Jan. 12, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1 (requiring 
sufficient evidence according to the laws of the place in which the person is located in order 
to grant extradition). 
 96. Gyles Beckford & Rebecca Hamilton, Megaupload Founder Faces Lengthy Extradi-
tion Battle, REUTERS, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-internet-piracy-megaupload-
extraditio-idUSTRE80O0B920120125 (last visited October. 27, 2016). 
 97. Michael John Garcia & Charles Doyle, Extradition to and from the United States: 
Overview of the Law and Recent Treaties, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 21–22 
(2010), https:// www. fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/98-958.pdf. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See United States v. All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d 813, 827–29 
(E.D. Va. 2015) (showing that claimants have declined to enter the United States by contest-
ing extradition). 
 100. Id. at 826. 
 101. 28 U.S.C. § 2466(a)(1) (2012). 
 102. Collazos v. United States, 368 F.3d 190, 201 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 103. United States v. Technodyne, L.L.C., 753 F.3d 368, 386 (2d Cir. 2014). 
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and sole reason view, claimants who exercise their right to resist extradition 
have been deemed fugitives with the necessary intent because their re-
sistance to extradition has been interpreted as intent to avoid entering the 
United States to face criminal prosecution.104 
B. Choices Between Rights 
The statutory provision of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine results in 
two sets of rights that cannot coexist with one another in the context of civil 
forfeiture and extradition. Under various extradition treaties, a claimant has 
one set of rights to legally contest extradition and the existence of probable 
cause,105 and under the Constitution, a claimant has another set of rights that 
requires an opportunity for a hearing before being deprived of his proper-
ty.106 Due to the application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine in a civil 
forfeiture action, an extradition claimant is often forced to choose which of 
these rights to exercise.107 
1. Due Process Rights “Voluntarily Waived” 
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that an indi-
vidual receive notice and an opportunity to be heard before the government 
can deprive him of his property in civil forfeiture.108 This right has long been 
recognized as fundamental, regardless of an individual’s status.109 Whether a 
civil or criminal case, a person “must be permitted to defend himself in any 
court where his antagonist can appear and prosecute.”110 This right belongs 
to every individual, regardless of whether he violated the law.111 The fugi-
tive disentitlement doctrine, however, extinguishes this due process right 
when civil forfeiture claimants are haled into court, labeled as fugitives, and 
 
 104. See generally All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F. Supp. 3d at 827–32 (finding 
five defendants to be fugitives subject to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine in a civil forfei-
ture act because their resistance to extradition showed an intent to avoid entering the jurisdic-
tion to face criminal prosecution); See also Collazos, 368 F.3d at 201; Technodyne, 753 F.3d 
at 385. 
 105. Garcia & Doyle, supra note 97, at 21–22. 
 106. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 48 (1993). 
 107. See generally All Assets Listed in Attachment A, 89 F.Supp.3d at 827–32 (finding 
that claimant intended to avoid prosecution through his contestation of extradition, which 
disentitled him from defending his property in the civil forfeiture action). 
 108. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. at 48. 
 109. Stolley, supra note 13, at 770. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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disentitled from the opportunity to defend against the government’s seizure 
of his property.112 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has answered this accusa-
tion in the civil forfeiture setting by stating that due process rights are not 
wrongfully denied through the application of fugitive disentitlement because 
the due process right in these cases has been waived.113 By refusing to ap-
pear in court for a related criminal case, a claimant is deemed to have know-
ingly waived his due process rights in the civil forfeiture action.114 A claim-
ant’s flight from justice is treated by the court as tantamount to a waiver or 
abandonment of his due process rights, thus resulting in no due process dep-
rivation in a disentitlement proceeding.115 As a result, when an extradition 
claimant exercises his right to contest extradition, he is labeled as a fugitive 
with the intent to avoid criminal prosecution and thus “voluntarily” waives 
his due process right to defend his property in a civil forfeiture action.116 
2. Extradition Rights v. Due Process Rights 
Due to the above interpretation of due process rights in civil forfeiture 
actions, an extradition claimant is entitled to exercise either his right to con-
test extradition117 or his due process right to defend his property,118 but not 
both. A foreign claimant contesting extradition can only vindicate his due 
process rights in regards to his property by submitting to the jurisdiction of 
the courts where he is criminally charged, which then results in an oppor-
tunity for him to defend his property.119 The claimant must first surrender to 
extradition, giving up his right to contest that extradition.120 Thus, a claimant 
involved in extradition has the choice of only exercising one set of these 
rights because the choice of one eliminates the other. 
 
 112. Id. at 771. 
 113. Collazos v. United States, 368 F.3d 190, 205 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 114. Id at 205–06. 
 115. Forfeitures and Penalties, supra note 21, § 53. 
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(E.D. Va. 2015) (finding that claimants consciously avoided criminal prosecution by resisting 
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for extradition). 
 118. Collazos, 368 F.3d at 204–05. 
 119. Forfeitures and Penalties, supra note 21, § 53. 
 120. Id. 
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C. Government Abuse in Civil Forfeiture 
Disentitlement in civil forfeiture actions also creates an environment 
that is ripe for abuse.121 The laws of civil forfeiture allow the government to 
take property “[b]ased on a legal fiction that property can be guilty of a 
criminal activity . . . regardless of whether the property owner is guilty or 
innocent.”122 The enactment of CAFRA broadened the scope for potential 
misuse of civil forfeiture by expanding the number of cases in which the 
government can seize property allegedly connected to criminal conduct.123 
The danger of abuse is also magnified when the government, despite an ob-
vious conflict of interest, serves as both the beneficiary and accuser in a 
civil forfeiture action.124 The potential for exploitation is even more serious 
when courts apply the disentitlement doctrine to a foreign claimant because 
it effectively transfers the claimant’s property to the government while 
denying the claimant his due process right to be heard.125 
1. Increased Reach of the Government in Civil Forfeiture 
The enactment of CAFRA, which added to existing civil forfeiture law, 
has increased the reach of civil forfeiture, both in regards to the crimes and 
the related property that are subject to seizure by the government.126 There 
are now over 400 federal statutes that authorize forfeiture relating to federal 
crimes, from environmental crimes to failure to report currency transac-
tions.127 Recent civil forfeitures laws have also broadened the scope of the 
property that can be seized from illegal drugs and the vehicles that trans-
ported them, to real and personal property connected to the alleged crime.128 
CAFRA also subjects different classes of property to forfeiture, such as 
property from proceeds of past crimes, property intended to commit or fi-
nance future crimes, and property that is involved in a current crime.129 De-
veloped as a response to the overreaching and abuse of civil forfeiture stat-
utes, CAFRA has instead exponentially increased the number of cases in 
which the government can seize property through civil forfeiture.130 
The jurisdiction of the United States courts concerning civil forfeiture 
has also expanded to include crimes that can be committed extraterritorially, 
 
 121. Sheth, supra note 86, at 24. 
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such as money laundering, drug trafficking, wire fraud, and international 
terrorism.131 Concerning crimes such as these, the jurisdictional scope of the 
relevant criminal statutes was interpreted as applying in civil forfeiture, be-
cause “Congress is presumed to intend extraterritorial application of crimi-
nal statutes where the nature of the crime does not depend on the locality of 
the defendants’ acts and where restricting the statute to United States territo-
ry would severally diminish the statute’s effectiveness.”132 As a result, any-
one who has ever made a payment online could be subject to United States 
jurisdiction if his payment was processed through American servers.133 
Due to the increased reach of the government’s jurisdiction, the mod-
ern scope of civil forfeiture increases the potential for governmental abuse, 
and fugitive disentitlement heightens that potential.134 The government now 
can bar a claimant from defending his property in many more situations than 
before by merely asserting that the claimant is a fugitive avoiding prosecu-
tion and that his property is somehow associated with the suspected crime 
from which he has escaped.135 The potential for abuse remains heightened in 
the context of a claimant contesting extradition.136 With more types of crime 
and increased categories of property subject to forfeiture,137 a claimant who 
is contesting extradition will be deemed as avoiding entering the United 
States in order to avoid prosecution and thus subject to disentitlement and 
forfeiture of much more of his property.138 
2. Government as Beneficiary and Accuser 
With the government serving simultaneously as the beneficiary and the 
accuser, the potential for abuse in civil forfeiture is even more dangerous.139 
Proceeds from forfeiture actions are placed into the Asset Forfeiture Fund, 
which is managed by the United States Marshal’s Service, to be shared with 
state and local agencies to assist in fighting crime.140 The revenue produced 
by civil forfeiture has exploded as a direct result of federal law broadening 
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the scope in which civil forfeiture applies.141 The United States Department 
of Justice’s Asset Forfeiture Fund has “grown exponentially.”142 For exam-
ple, it increased from $93.7 million in 1986 to over $1 billion by 2008.143 
State law enforcement agencies have also benefited from these forfeitures 
by receiving money from federal equitable-sharing programs, which pay 
them up to eighty percent of the proceeds for referring civil forfeitures to 
federal authorities.
 144 These equitable-sharing programs provide a large part 
of state and local law enforcement funds. Additionally, law enforcement can 
use these funds in any way they see fit to support law enforcement activi-
ties.145 
As a result of these programs, government and state actors benefit from 
the proceeds and property seized through civil forfeiture.146 Lawyers at the 
federal level have even been encouraged by the Department of Justice to 
litigate more civil forfeitures actions in order to meet the Department’s tar-
geted budget.147 Through its role as both beneficiary and accuser,148 law en-
forcement agents have been able to self-finance through forfeiture pro-
ceeds.149 These forfeiture proceeds, however, have been abused by law en-
forcement in several circumstances on questionable purchases, such as alco-
hol, drugs, prostitutes, football tickets, new cars, and television commercials 
for an election campaign.150 
By disentitling a foreign claimant as a fugitive, a court can effectively 
transfer the claimant’s property to the government and deny the claimant the 
right to be heard.151 To qualify for forfeiture, the disputed property must be 
related to an alleged crime, but, without a hearing, a disentitled fugitive is 
deprived of his opportunity to show that his property is unrelated to the 
crime and not subject to forfeiture.152 Thus, on mere allegations, the gov-
ernment can confiscate a fugitive’s property through the use of “artful plead-
 
 141. Sheth, supra note 86, at 25. 
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ing” by asserting that the claimant is a fugitive and that the property is relat-
ed to the crime from which he is avoiding prosecution.153 
3. Dangers of Stripping Away Due Process Rights 
Due to the inherent potential for abuse in civil forfeiture actions, courts 
must be vigilant in protecting constitutional safeguards.154 The Fifth 
Amendment right to due process requires that a defendant be given notice 
and an adequate hearing on the merits before he can be deprived of his life, 
liberty, or property.155 In Hovey v. Elliot, the Supreme Court stated that the 
right to defend was an independent due process right: 
To say that courts have inherent power to deny all right to defend an ac-
tion, and to render decrees without any hearing whatever, is, in the very 
nature of things, to convert the court exercising such an authority into an 
instrument of wrong and oppression, and hence to strip it of that attribute 




This foundation of due process requires that an individual be permitted 
to defend himself or his property in any court where his adversary can ap-
pear and prosecute.157 By disentitling a claimant in a civil forfeiture action, 
the “government effectively strips away the rights to be heard and to defend 
and transfers the property to the government based on the government’s 
mere allegations of its connection to a crime.”158 The government thus hales 
the claimant into court and then summarily denies an opportunity to defend 
against the seizure of his property.159 Therefore, disentitlement becomes a 
“thinly veiled excuse for punishment for an offense having no relation to the 
merits of the government’s claims or the claimant’s defense.”160 Also, by 
disentitling the claimant in a civil forfeiture action, the “government effec-
tively strips away the rights to be heard and to defend and transfers the 
property to the government based on the government’s mere allegations of 
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its connection to a crime.” 161 Thus, procedural safeguards to protect due 
process remain necessary in civil forfeiture actions because of the direct 
financial stake that the government has in the outcome of the forfeiture pro-
ceedings.162 
IV. SOLUTIONS: PRESERVATION OF RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS 
In order to preserve the rights of extradition claimants and to shield 
them from potential government abuse in civil forfeiture, extradition claim-
ants need more robust protections. A narrower definition of “fugitive” in the 
disentitlement doctrine would protect more of claimants’ rights in extradi-
tion proceedings.163 Also, if Congress were to exclude extradition claimants 
from the application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine by amending the 
current statute, these claimants would be shielded from government abuse 
by the ability to exercise their rights concerning both due process164 and ex-
tradition.165 Codifying the intent analysis of the Sixth and District of Colum-
bia Circuits166 concerning the disentitlement doctrine would be another 
method that Congress could use to protect these claimants in civil forfeiture. 
A. Narrower Definition of Fugitive 
By introducing a narrower definition of a “fugitive” into the fugitive 
disentitlement doctrine, extradition claimants would be exempt from disenti-
tlement and their various rights would be kept intact. Before CAFRA, a per-
son who had never been present at a locality and then refused to enter was 
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not deemed a fugitive.167 The definition of fugitive was more in line with its 
common law definition, which stated that a fugitive from justice was a per-
son who, after committing a crime, fled the jurisdiction of the court where 
the crime was committed or who concealed himself to avoid prosecution.168 
The premise of this definition was that a defendant who deliberately diso-
beyed the legal system should be disentitled from using the court’s resources 
to determine his claims.169 
By returning to the common law definition of fugitive, the purpose of 
the disentitlement doctrine would still be accomplished, and the rights of 
foreign claimants in civil forfeiture actions would be respected. Foreign 
claimants involved in extradition have a right to contest their extradition 
under many treaties.170 By exercising this right, extradition claimants who 
have never entered the United States are not flouting the justice system by 
fleeing the jurisdiction; therefore, the rationale underlying disentitlement 
does not justify disentitling them from contesting the civil forfeiture of their 
property. 
1. Eliminate Phrase “To Enter” From 28 U.S.C. § 2466 
A narrower definition of fugitive could also be achieved by eliminating 
the phrase “to enter”171 from the codified disentitlement doctrine. By using 
the phrases “enter” and “reenter,” Congress extended the disentitlement doc-
trine beyond common law fugitives—persons who were in the United States 
when they committed their alleged crimes and refused to return—to individ-
uals who have never been in the United States, but refuse to enter the coun-
try.172 By eliminating the phrase “to enter” from 28 U.S.C. § 2466, extradi-
tion claimants who had never entered the United States would not automati-
cally be eligible for the application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine by 
the exercise of their rights to contest extradition. 
Foreign claimants living abroad most likely were not residing in their 
home country to avoid prosecution in the United States; this is especially 
true of claimants who have never set foot in the United States.173 Declaring 
these claimants, who are fighting extradition to stay in their home, to be 
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fugitives and thus barred from defending their property174 is an abuse of dis-
entitlement and a distortion of the term fugitive. 
2. Protection of Extradition Claimant’s Rights 
If the fugitive disentitlement doctrine were more narrowly tailored to 
exclude defendants who had never entered the United States and were con-
testing extradition, the rights of extradition plaintiffs in civil forfeiture ac-
tions would be protected. The present codification of the doctrine175 restricts 
a foreign claimant from exercising his legal right to contest extradition or, 
conversely, his right to a due process hearing in the civil forfeiture action.176 
By disentitling a claimant who “declines to enter”177 the jurisdiction of the 
United States, the courts have effectively prevented any claimant from con-
testing forfeiture from abroad.178 
By returning to a narrower definition of a fugitive as a person who 
flees a place after committing a crime to avoid prosecution, a foreign claim-
ant, who contests the sufficiency of probable cause for his extradition, will 
not be subject to disentitlement simply because his contestation of extradi-
tion is interpreted as refusal to enter the United States. The foreign claimant 
may still be deemed a fugitive if he refuses to return to the country after 
committing a crime here, or if he flees and evades the jurisdiction.179 Claim-
ants legally residing abroad, however, would be able to use their due process 
right to defend the civil forfeiture, as well as maintain their legal right to 
contest extradition, without being forced to choose between the two. 
B. Exclude Extradition Claimants from the Application of 28 U.S.C. § 
2466 
Another solution to preserve the rights of claimants legally resisting ex-
tradition would be prohibiting the application of the disentitlement doctrine. 
The purpose of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine is to prohibit individuals 
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from using the resources of the courts to further their claims while avoiding 
the courts’ jurisdiction in another matter.180 This purpose is not constitution-
ally construed when the application of the doctrine results in the loss of ei-
ther the claimant’s extradition or due process rights. Prohibiting the applica-
tion of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to claimants who are legal resi-
dents of a foreign country would prevent government abuse in civil forfei-
ture by retaining their right to be heard and to defend their property. Accord-
ingly, claimants involved in extradition should be exempt from disentitle-
ment in forfeiture proceedings in order to preserve their rights and be pro-
tected from potential forfeiture abuse. 
1. Rationales of 28 U.S.C. § 2466 Do Not Apply to Extradition 
Claimants 
Fugitive disentitlement has been applied in forfeiture proceedings in 
order to prevent “the impropriety of permitting a fugitive to pursue a [civil] 
claim in federal court where he might accrue a benefit, while at the same 
time avoiding a [criminal] action of the same court that might sanction 
him”181 An extradition claimant, however, is not “flouting” the system when 
he chooses to exercise his legal right to show that the foreign state lacks 
probable cause in an extradition hearing.182 
Several other rationales have been proposed for the fugitive disentitle-
ment doctrine since its introduction into common law, such as enforceabil-
ity, disentitlement, the efficiency and dignity of the appellate process, and 
deterrence.183 These rationales, however, are inapplicable in the extradition 
context. The first rationale, enforceability of a court’s judgment, was based 
on the concept that a criminal defendant who flees from justice during the 
time of his appeal cannot be forced to submit to that court’s judgment.184 
Thus, a fugitive defendant could not benefit from a successful appeal, or 
conversely, evade an adverse adjudication.185 An absent claimant in a civil 
forfeiture proceeding, however, “does not threaten the integrity of the forfei-
ture proceeding.”186 In a civil forfeiture action, the court must have jurisdic-
 
 180. United States v. $6,190.00 in U.S. Currency, 581 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 181. Collazos v. United States, 368 F.3d 190, 197 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 182. Beckford & Hamilton, supra note 96, at *1. Under New Zealand extradition law, the 
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 183. Griffith, supra note 23, at 209. 
 184. Stolley, supra note 13, at 776. 
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tion over the property, not the claimant.187 Thus, despite a claimant’s ab-
sence, a valid order of forfeiture would be fully enforceable.188 As a result, a 
foreign claimant’s presence or absence at the proceeding would have no 
effect on the enforceability of the forfeiture. 
The second rationale, disentitlement of a fugitive, has also been ration-
alized on the theory that a fugitive’s flight to avoid prosecution is “‘tanta-
mount to [a] waiver or abandonment’ of any appeal or claim”, and thus the 
fugitive is disentitled to relief.189 In this context, the fugitive is deemed to 
have disrespected the legal process and therefore has no right to call upon 
the court to adjudicate his claim.190 This may be true where a fugitive appel-
lant seeks a reversal of a conviction by using the court to his own benefit 
while evading the court’s jurisdiction in the case of an unfavorable adjudica-
tion.191 In a civil forfeiture action, however, the claimant does not initiate the 
proceedings or initiate the use of the resources of the court.192 Thus, the ex-
pansion of disentitlement into cases where a claimant is barred from defend-
ing his property would result in a violation of due process.193 A claimant in a 
civil forfeiture action initiated by the government is not “‘call[ing] upon the 
court;’ he’s merely defending himself and his property.”194 The claimant 
also has not scorned the judicial authority of the courts or sought out the 
court system for relief.195 
The third rationale, the efficiency and dignity of the appellate process, 
also does not apply to fugitive disentitlement concerning extradition claim-
ants. The disentitlement doctrine was originally designed to “ensure orderly 
and efficient judicial procedure.”196 This rationale was based on the idea that 
the fugitive’s absence during the appellate process was a defiance of the 
legal system and that the fugitive’s escape caused delay in court proceed-
ings.197 A fugitive appellant’s absence during a criminal appeal “disrupt[ed] 
the orderly flow” of a court’s judicial process.198 In order to prevent these 
delays, courts have inherent power to address the issues presented by crimi-
nal fugitives who have flaunted the appellate process.199 
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234, 240 (1993)). 
 188. Brief Amici Curiae, supra note 33, at 18. 
 189. Stolley, supra note 13, at 777. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Brief Amici Curiae, supra note 33, at 19. 
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A claimant’s failure to appear in a civil forfeiture action, however, has 
no effect on the court’s proceedings.200 An absent claimant can effectively 
appear by counsel in the forfeiture proceeding and, through this counsel, the 
claimant can satisfactorily adjudicate his challenge to the forfeiture.201 The 
claimant’s absence thus has no effect on the proceedings of the court, and 
the claimant’s absence in the separate criminal case does not in any way 
affect the integrity of the forfeiture action.202 In sum, a claimant’s absence in 
a forfeiture proceeding while he is contesting extradition has no effect on 
the proceedings on the court and, as a result, the disentitlement of funda-
mental due process protection is an unnecessary remedy for a problem that 
does not exist. 
The last rationale proposed for disentitlement also does not hold true in 
the context of civil forfeiture with foreign claimants. This rationale states 
that by threatening disentitlement in criminal appeals, a defendant would be 
less inclined to flee from justice.203 This threat would be a powerful incen-
tive not to flee for a criminal fugitive who would lose his opportunity to be 
vindicated in an appeal.204 This deterrence, however, does not hold true for a 
foreign claimant in an extradition proceeding because “[g]ranting a hearing 
on the validity of seizure to forfeiture claimants who are fugitives in a crim-
inal proceeding does not encourage potential defendants to flee.”205 In the 
context of foreign claimants, the “alleged ‘fugitives’ never ‘escaped’ from 
anywhere—they merely continued to lawfully reside in their countries of 
residence—there is no conduct to deter.”206 As the Supreme Court in Degan 
v. United States stated, “the need to deter flight from criminal prosecution . . 
. [is] substantial, but disentitlement is too blunt an instrument for advancing 
them.”207 
2. Protection of Due Process and Extradition Related Rights 
By excluding foreign claimants involved in extradition from the appli-
cation of fugitive disinterment, their due process right to an opportunity to 
defend their property and their right to contest extradition would be pre-
served. One court has stated that the exercise of rights in the claimants’ 
home country “may cause disadvantages for the claimants with respect to 
litigation occurring in America [but that] does not mean that they are being 
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treated unfairly or that they are denied their enjoyment of rights in [their 
home country].”208 The choice that extradition claimants are forced to make 
in a civil forfeiture proceeding between their due process rights and right to 
contest extradition shows the falsity of this statement. The rationales of dis-
entitlement in forfeiture do not apply to foreign claimants in any meaningful 
way,209 and instead the application of the doctrine works a gross injustice by 
denying them the opportunity to contest forfeiture of their property or by 
denying them the opportunity to contest their extradition. 
If extradition claimants were exempted from the disentitlement doc-
trine, they would be free to exercise both their right to a hearing in the civil 
forfeiture action and their right to contest their extradition upon a showing 
of lack of probable cause. A civil forfeiture action does not require that any-
one be charged with a crime.210 Thus, the presence of the defendant in the 
related criminal matter has no bearing on the validity of the forfeiture ac-
tion.211 Disentitlement serves none of the purposes behind its enactment, 
other than acting as a “‘random pattern of punishment’ and a ‘miscarriage of 
justice.’”212 
Courts have a valid interest in deterring crime, and civil forfeiture, 
when properly applied, can serve the public good.213 Property that is not 
illegally acquired or used, however, should not be subject to forfeiture even 
if the owner of the property is a fugitive.214 Thus, a forfeiture action should 
not be dismissed because “[t]he only way to make a just determination of 
whether that property is forfeitable is to afford the claimant an opportunity 
to be heard.”215 Constitutional and treaty-related rights would not be tram-
pled by excusing foreign claimants involved in extradition proceedings from 
disentitlement.216 Other foreign claimants not involved in extradition, how-
ever, who could not prove the innocent ownership of their property, would 
still lose that property in civil forfeiture, thus upholding the integrity of the 
forfeiture proceeding.217 
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3. Shield from Potential Government Abuse 
If extradition claimants were exempted from the disentitlement doc-
trine, they would be better equipped to battle the prevalence of government 
abuse by their ability to defend a civil forfeiture action.218 The government is 
the initiator in a civil forfeiture action, and the property owner is in court, 
not by his or her own actions, but rather in order to defend his property 
against that action.219 Thus, the application of the doctrine in civil forfeiture 
actions is “inherently unfair” where “the government already has a substan-
tial advantage over the claimants.”220 The government need only show prob-
able cause that the property is related to the alleged crime, and this ad-
vantage further outweighs the claimant’s hefty burden of proof when he is 
disentitled to defend the government’s allegations.
 221 As a result, the gov-
ernment avoids its slight burden and prevents a claimant from defending 
against a “possibly unfair seizure.”222 
Disentitlement eliminates court examination as to whether the govern-
ment seized property in a forfeiture proceeding to which it has no legal 
right.223 Therefore, the government is able to abuse disentitlement by avoid-
ing “judicial scrutiny of the soundness of its allegations and the merits of its 
case.”224 This potential for abuse is magnified when the exercise of extradi-
tion rights is interpreted as refusal to enter the United States, thus invoking 
disentitlement and barring a foreign claimant from defending his property 
against the government’s allegations.225 As a result, foreign claimants should 
be exempt from the application of 28 U.S.C. § 2466 when they are legally 
contesting extradition, and should be allowed to counter the potential for 
government abuse in civil forfeiture. 
C. Universally Adopt the Intent Analysis of the Sixth and District of Co-
lumbia Circuits 
Extradition claimants in a civil forfeiture action would be afforded 
more protection of their rights if the intent analysis from the Sixth and Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuits were universally adopted in the application of the 
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disentitlement doctrine. This intent analysis focuses on more than just a 
claimant’s knowledge of a warrant for his arrest paired with the claimant’s 
refusal to enter the United States when determining if a claimant had the 
requisite intent necessary for the invocation of disentitlement.226 
Under any of the three ways provided by the statute to prove evasion, 
the fugitive must have acted “in order to avoid criminal prosecution.”227 
Thus, a foreign claimant must have acted with the intent to avoid prosecu-
tion when declining to enter the country.228 The government is then charged 
with proving its burden that a claimant remained outside the United States in 
order to avoid the criminal charges against him.229 
As the District of Columbia Circuit noted in $6,976,934.65, Plus Inter-
est, the government does not meet this burden simply by showing that the 
claimant in the civil forfeiture action remained outside of United States ju-
risdiction.230 The court concluded that because the claimant voluntarily left 
the United States before the criminal prosecution, and because there was 
evidence that the claimant did not wish to reenter the United States regard-
less of any criminal charges, the government did not meet its burden of 
proof regarding the necessary intent for disentitlement. 231 The Sixth Circuit 
echoed this in United States v. Salti232 when it determined that the claimant’s 
intent to avoid prosecution was not sufficiently proved due to factors that 
showed that the claimant might have refused to return to the United States 
for health reasons, and not necessarily to avoid criminal proceedings.233 
If this analysis of the requisite intent under disentitlement were adopt-
ed, foreign claimants would be presented with an opportunity to show that 
their contestation of extradition was due to other factors other than avoiding 
criminal prosecution. Although avoiding criminal prosecution may be a sig-
nificant motivation for a claimant’s refusal to enter the United States, there 
are numerous other factors that may affect a foreign claimant’s decision to 
contest his extradition.234 If these factors were found to be a sufficiently mo-
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tivating force behind the claimant’s desire to not enter the United States, 
disentitlement would not strip him of the ability to defend the forfeiture of 
his property. Unlike the other circuit approaches to the intent analysis, 
which focus on the resistance of extradition as an obvious exhibition of in-
tent to avoid prosecution,235 the government would have to clearly show the 
claimant’s intent by more than the fact that the claimant exercised his legal 
right to contest the probable cause sufficient for his extradition. 
The adoption of the intent analysis of the D.C. and Sixth Circuits 
would provide foreign claimants, who are resisting extradition for reasons 
other than the sole desire to avoid criminal proceedings, more protections in 
civil forfeiture actions through the exercise of their rights. However, the 
disentitlement doctrine would still be applicable to those extradition claim-
ants who declined to enter or re-enter the country solely in order to avoid 
prosecution.236 This analysis of intent would strike a balance between the 
interests of a foreign claimant resisting extradition for valid reasons other 
than prosecution avoidance and the Congressional and judicial interests in 
disallowing foreign fugitives to call upon the resources of the court while 
simultaneously evading its jurisdiction with the intent to avoid criminal 
prosecution.237 Accordingly, this approach would provide foreign claimants 
more protections than the methods provided by other circuits. As a result, 
this intent analysis should be universally adopted to ensure that foreign 
claimants in civil forfeiture are given a better opportunity to exercise all of 
their rights, both in due process and extradition, before disentitlement is 
invoked in any civil forfeiture action. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The application of the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine in a civil for-
feiture action involving extradition claimants creates complications and un-
foreseen consequences. The codification of the doctrine in 28 U.S.C. § 2466 
has only exacerbated these problems. Claimants are denied an opportunity to 
defend their property, and thus are stripped of their due process rights and 
are more exposed to potential government abuse in forfeiture. Forfeiture 
claimants have a right to defend their property before it can be permanently 
seized. This right should not be affected through their exercise of additional 
rights during the extradition process. 
 
United States v. Technodyne, L.L.C., 753 F.3d 368, 376 (2d Cir. 2014) (arguing that claim-
ants remained abroad because of publicity, and seizure of their property left them without 
means of financial support in the United States). 
 235. See generally supra notes 92–94, and accompanying text. 
 236. See 28 U.S.C. § 2466(a)(1)(C) (2012). 
 237. See Collazos v. United States, 368 F.3d 190, 197 (2d Cir. 2004). 
154 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
In order to safeguard the protections these rights encompass, the codi-
fied fugitive disentitlement needs to be revised. This revision could take the 
form of the Supreme Court resolving the split in the circuits by holding that 
the intent element under the statute is best met by analyzing whether avoid-
ance of criminal prosecution was the sole reason the alleged fugitive de-
clined to enter or re-enter the United States. The rights of claimants in ex-
tradition and civil forfeiture would also be protected if Congress redrafted 
the disentitlement provision to exclude persons living abroad who had never 
entered the United States. These provisions would enable foreign petitioners 
to preserve their right to contest extradition, as well as ensure their right to a 
due process hearing to defend the civil forfeiture action. 
Foreign supplicants in civil forfeiture actions would no longer have to 
choose between their right to defend their property or their right to contest 
extradition. Extradition claimants are innocent until proved guilty in a relat-
ed criminal matter, and their property should not be forfeited absent an op-
portunity to prove the disconnect between the property seized and the al-
leged criminal activity. By narrowing the scope of the disentitlement doc-
trine as applied to extradition claimants or by eliminating them from the 
scope of the doctrine altogether, foreign claimants would be protected from 
potential government abuse in civil forfeiture, and their rights to due process 
and concerning extradition would be kept intact. 
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